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Abstract
This paper tests whether the exchange rates of the Czech koruna, the Hungarian forint, and
the Polish zloty were anchored by market expectations concerning their euro locking rates.
First, the process of the exchange rate is derived as a function of the following factors: (i)
latent exchange rate, (ii) market expectations concerning locking rate, (iii) market expectations
concerning locking date. Then, the locking dates and rates are ﬁltered from historical exchange
rates, currency option prices and yield curves. The main ﬁnding of the paper is that the relatively
stable market expectations concerning the locking rates have substantially stabilized the three
analyzed exchange rates.
JEL: F31, F36, G13.
Keywords: Monetary union, eurozone entry, factor model, Kalman ﬁlter, exchange rate
stabilization, asset-pricing exchange rate model.
O¨sszefoglalo´
A tanulma´ny azt teszteli, hogy vajon lehorgonyozza-e a cseh korona, a magyar forint e´s a
lengyel zlotyi a´rfolyama´t az euro konverzio´s ra´ta´ra vonatkozo´ piaci va´rakoza´s. Elo˝szo¨r lev-
ezetem az a´rfolyam folyamata´t a ko¨vetkezo˝ ha´rom faktor fu¨ggve´nyeke´nt: (i) la´tens a´rfolyam,
(ii) a konverzio´s ra´ta´ra vonatkozo´ piaci va´rakoza´s, (iii) a ve´gso˝ konverzio´ ideje´re vonatkozo´
piaci va´rakoza´s. Majd historikus a´rfolyam, deviza opcio´ e´s hozam go¨rbe adatokbo´l ﬁlterezem
a konverzio´s ra´ta´ra e´s a konverzio´ ideje´re vonatkozo´ va´rakoza´sokat. A tanulma´ny legfontosabb
eredme´nye, hogy a konverzio´s ra´ta´ra vonatkozo´ va´rakoza´sok stabilita´sa jelento˝sen cso¨kkentette
a ha´rom vizsga´lt a´rfolyam volatilita´sa´t.
JEL-ko´d: F31, F36, G13.
Kulcsszavak: Moneta´ris unio´, eurozo´na-csatlakoza´s, faktor modell, Ka´lma´n ﬁlter, a´rfolyam
stabiliza´cio´, eszko¨z-a´raza´si a´rfolyam modell.
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Are the Exchange Rates of EMU Candidate
Countries Anchored by their Expected Euro Locking
Rates?
Anna Naszodi1
1 Introduction
This paper investigates the stabilizing feature of the market expectations concerning the euro
locking rate. I apply the analysis to three countries, Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland,
which are expected to join the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) in a couple of years.
First, I extend the conventional asset-pricing exchange rate model with the ﬁnal locking
assumption. In the conventional asset-pricing model the exchange rate is the linear combination
of the fundamental and the expected present discounted value of future shocks. Similarly, in
the model with ﬁnal locking the exchange rate is a linear combination of the fundamental
and the market expectations concerning the euro locking rate. The relative weights of the
linear combination depend on the market expectations concerning the locking date. The asset-
pricing model with ﬁnal locking is a three-factor 2 model, where the factors are the market
expectations concerning the locking rate and date. The third factor is the fundamental, which
drives the exchange rates even if no locking is expected in the future. Therefore, I will refer to
the fundamental as the latent exchange rate, i.e. the exchange rate that would prevail if the
currency was never going to be locked against the euro.
Then, in the empirical part of the paper, I ﬁlter out the three factors from the historical
exchange rate, interest rate and currency option data. I estimate the expected date of locking
from the euro and domestic yield curves by following the method suggested by Bates (1999). 3
The other two factors are ﬁltered out from the historical exchange rate by the Kalman
ﬁlter technique. The Kalman ﬁlter decomposes the exchange rate changes into changes in the
remaining two factors by utilizing the identiﬁcation through the variances. To estimate the
time-varying variances of the innovations of the factors, I use a theoretical option pricing model
derived in the paper and cross-sectional data on option prices with diﬀerent maturities. The
identiﬁcation of the time-varying variances is based on the followings. Option prices both with
long and short maturities are functions of the variances of innovations of the latent exchange
1Magyar Nemzeti Bank, Budapest, Hungary Central European University, Budapest, Hungary
email : naszodia@mnb.hu, cphnaa01@phd.ceu.hu
2The stabilizing eﬀect of locking is analyzed in a similar, but simpler model by De Grauwe et al. (1999/a,b)
and by Wilﬂing and Maennig (2001). Both papers demonstrate the impact of locking with two-factor models.
The factors in De Grauwe et al. (1999/a,b) are the fundamental and locking rate and the announced locking date
is assumed to be credible. Whereas the factors of Wilﬂing and Maennig (2001) are the fundamental and locking
date and no uncertainty is assumed concerning the locking rate. Therefore, the theoretical contribution of this
paper to the literature is that all three sources of uncertainties are taken into account, moreover, the comovements
between the factors are modeled as well.
3The yield curve based EMU probability calculator approach has been implemented inter alia by Lund (1999)
and Favero et al. (2000). An alternative of the yield curve based EMU probability calculator is the currency
options based calculator suggested by Driessen and Perotti (2004).
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rate and the market expectation concerning the locking rate. However, the long end of the
option term structure is inﬂuenced more by the variance of the market expectation concerning
the locking rate, than the short end.
By investigating the ﬁltered market expectation concerning the euro locking rate I make
inferences on the exchange rate stabilizing eﬀect of the locking. I ﬁnd that the market expectation
concerning the euro locking rate is less volatile than either the historical exchange rate or the
ﬁltered latent exchange rate. This result has the important implication that the prospect of
locking has a stabilizing eﬀect on the exchange rate in all three analyzed countries. Moreover,
this stabilizing eﬀect is substantial despite that locking in these countries will take place in the
relatively far future and the locking date is highly uncertain yet.
Rather than ﬁltering market expectations, I could, theoretically, have obtained the market
expectations from an alternative source (Reuters polls) or with an alternative method (estimat-
ing equilibrium exchange rates). However, ﬁltering has some advantages over its alternatives,
for the reasons outlined below.
Reuters regularly4 surveys the expectations of analysts concerning the dates of EMU and
ERM II entries and concerning the central parities in ERM II of all three analyzed countries. The
central parity expected by respondents may be considered as the market expectations concerning
the ﬁnal conversion rate. And the reported expectations concerning either the date of EMU or
ERM II entries may be considered as the market expectations concerning the locking date. Yet
extracting market expectations from daily historical exchange rate and interest rate data may
yield more accurate and more up-to-date information than the monthly or quarterly Reuters
polls. Moreover, the higher frequency of the ﬁltered expectations enables us to investigate the
stabilizing eﬀect of the prospect of locking has on the exchange rate.
As the EMU candidate countries aim at having their irrevocable conversion rates set equal
to their equilibrium exchange rates, reliable estimates on the latter also reﬂect market expec-
tations concerning the ﬁnal conversion rate. In the context of our research this concept poses,
however, at least three kinds of problems.5 First, economists use a number of diﬀerent concepts
to deﬁne and a number of diﬀerent methods6 to estimate the equilibrium real exchange rate.
Second, these estimates refer to the real rather than the nominal exchange rate. Third, market
expectations might deviate from the estimated nominal equilibrium exchange rate, especially if
the choice of the ﬁnal conversion rate is based not only on observable fundamentals, but also
on unobservables. For instance, if not only economic, but also political considerations do play
a role in the negotiations over the locking rates. Another example is, when the locking rate is
determined by a backward looking manner, i.e. by a kind of average of past exchange rates. 7
In that case, speculative price pressure8 can push away the exchange rate from its equilibrium
level and the bubble will never burst due the locking.
The novelty of this paper is that it ﬁlters the subjective market expectation concerning the
ﬁnal conversion rate from exchange rate, interest rate and currency option data, which should
4The frequency of these surveys are monthly for Hungary and quarterly for Czech Republic and Poland.
5Egert, Halpern and MacDonald (2006) survey a number of issues related to the equilibrium exchange rates
of transition economies. They conclude that ”deriving a precise ﬁgure for the equilibrium real exchange rates
in general and also for the transition economies is close to mission impossible as there is a great deal of model
uncertainty related to the theoretical background and to the set of fundamentals chosen.”
6Williamson (1994) gives an overview of the widely used FEER, BEER, NATREX methods.
7This rule for setting the conversion rate is better known as the Lamfalussy rule, named after the former
president of the European Monetary Institute.
8The personal view of the author is that the chances for the analyzed currencies to be subject to speculative
exchange rate pressure before they enter the ERM II or even in the ERM II system have increased by experiencing
the Slovakian ERM II band shift on 16th of March 2007.
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mirror all the information that the market use at forming their expectations and at pricing
bonds, options and currencies. This set of information is likely to be wider than the one that is
used in the literature of estimating equilibrium exchange rate.
One of the important contributions of the paper to the theoretical exchange rate literature
is that it ﬁnds empirical support for the conventional asset-pricing exchange rate model. By
comparing the ﬁltered market expectations concerning the locking rate with the survey-based
expectations I ﬁnd that the diﬀerence between the two is small for all three countries. Further,
if we consider the survey-based expectations to be unbiased estimates9 on the general view of
the markets, then the model used for ﬁltering should be taken to be successful provided the
ﬁltered expectations are close to the reported expectations of the surveys. Moreover, the ﬁltered
locking rate for Hungary correlates somewhat more with the survey-based average expectations
than the historical exchange rate. This ﬁnding can be interpreted, as the model helped to
denoise the exchange rate, which is just a rough proxy of the expected future locking rate. This
test of the model is similar in spirit to the one applied by Engel and West (2005). They use
the functional relationship of the model between the current fundamental and the discounted
future fundamental on one hand and the exchange rate on the other hand to forecast future
fundamental. They ﬁnd evidence for forecasting ability, what can be interpreted as a general
support for the conventional asset-pricing exchange rate models and also for this speciﬁc model.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the exchange rate model. Section 3
derives an option pricing formula, which is utilized for parameter estimation in the empirical
part of the paper. Section 4 shows some stylized facts supporting the stabilizing eﬀect. Section
5 presents the ﬁltering methods and their applications. Finally, Section 6 concludes.
2 Exchange Rate Model
The exchange rate model is the conventional asset-pricing exchange rate model extended with
the assumption of ﬁnal locking. In the conventional asset-pricing model the exchange rate is
the linear combination of the fundamental and the expected present discounted value of future
shocks. Another extended version of the asset-pricing model is the target-zone model of Krugman
(1991), which shows some similarities to this model.
First, in Krugman’s model, the exchange rate would be equal to the fundamental if there
would be no target-zone. Similarly, in our model, the log exchange rate would be equal to the
fundamental in the absence of future locking. Given this relationship, I refer to the fundamental
as the latent exchange rate, i.e. the exchange rate that would prevail if the currency was never
going to be locked against the euro. While Krugman investigates the stabilizing feature of the
target-zone with a ﬂoating regime as a bench-mark, I explore the stabilizing eﬀect of future
locking with the ”no locking” as a bench-mark.
Second, the implicit relationship between the exchange rate subject to future locking and
the latent exchange rate in this model is the same as the relationship between the target-
zone exchange rate and the fundamental in Krugman’s model. In general, this relationship
between the exchange rate and the fundamental is common across all asset-pricing approach
based representative agent models. I can formulate this relationship as follows in a reduced
form:
st = vt + c
Et(dst)
dt
. (1)
9Our conﬁdence on this result should depend, however, on how reliable are the survey data. The survey data
usually tend to show systematic bias in the reported expectations as it has been documented by the early papers
of Frankel and Froot (1987) and Froot and Frankel (1989).
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Here, st is the log exchange rate, and vt is the log latent exchange rate. The constant c is the
time scale. Engel and West (2005) and Svensson (1991) presents the Money Income Model 10 as
one possible structural model that rationalizes the reduced form (1), where c is the interest rate
semi-elasticity of the money demand. The term Et(dst)dt is the expected
11 instantaneous change
of the exchange rate. As I will derive it, the expected instantaneous change of the exchange
rate depends on the log latent exchange rate vt, the market expectation concerning the log ﬁnal
conversion rate xt and concerning the time of locking Tt.
In the following, I deﬁne the latent exchange rate as a function of some macro variables
based on the Money Income Model:
vt = −αyt + qt + cψt − p∗t + mt + ci∗t . (2)
In this respect, y denotes the domestic real output, q is the real log exchange rate, ψ is the
risk premium, p∗ is the eurozone log price, m denotes the domestic nominal money supply and
i∗ is the euro interest rate.
As mentioned above, it is aimed to lock the exchange rates at their equilibrium levels. I use
a concept of equilibrium exchange rate under which the strong law of purchasing power parity
(PPP) holds for the locking rate, i.e. the log nominal exchange rate at the time of locking is
equal to the diﬀerence between the domestic and eurozone log prices: sT = pT − p∗T . Under
rational expectation the market expects the log ﬁnal conversion rate at time t to be xt = Et(sT ),
which gives
xt = pt − p∗t +
∫ Tt
t
Et(πτ − π∗τ )dτ . (3)
Where π and π∗ denote domestic and eurozone inﬂation rates respectively.
Neither the deﬁnitions (3) and (2) nor the corresponding macro data are used directly in the
empirical part of the paper - mainly because of the low frequency of these data, but also because
of a possible misspeciﬁcation of the underlying macro models. For instance, the examples of
the current EMU countries show that the locking rate can deviate from its PPP value. Still,
it is the equilibrium real exchange rate that should be the key determinant of the locking rate
chosen on the basis of economic considerations. Therefore, while not used directly in the rest of
the paper, these deﬁnitions motivate the calibration of the model, the choice of the processes of
the underlying factors and the interpretation of the results.
2.1 Dynamics
In this subsection I specify the processes of the factors. These processes will be used to derive
the process of the exchange rate.
I start by assuming that the factors follow Brownian motions. This assumption can be de-
composed into an assumption on the martingale property of the processes and into the Gaussian
10The Money Income Model is the following.
(1f) mt − pt = αyt − cit α > 0 c > 0 money market equilibrium
(2f) qt = st + p
∗
t − pt real exchange rate
(3f) ψt = it − i∗t − E(dst)dt risk premium
(4f) vt = −αyt + qt + cψt − p∗t + mt + ci∗t fundamental/latent exchange rate.
11I consider two diﬀerent types of expectations in the paper. One is the subjective market expectation, and
the other is the mathematical expected value of a random variable. Here, I refer to the latter one. In order to
distinguish between the two, I refer to the ﬁrst type of expectation as the market expectation. However, under
rational expectation the two are the same.
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distribution of the innovations. The Gaussian distribution of the innovations is assumed for
technical reason. The martingale property of these processes, however, can be easily explained:
- Under rational expectation, the expectation of the market participants concerning the log
ﬁnal conversion rate is the expected value of the log ﬁnal conversion rate given all the information
available at the time the expectation is formed by the market (xt = Et(sT )). And also the market
expectation concerning the time of locking is the expected value of the true time of locking T ∗
given all the information available at the time the expectation is formed (Tt = Et(T ∗)). The
law of iterated expectations implies that the process of both Tt and xt are martingales, since
Et(Et+1(sT )) = Et(sT ) and Et(Et+1(T ∗)) = Et(T ∗).
- The martingale property of the process of the log latent exchange rate can be derived from
the Money Income Model under the assumption that the right hand side variables of equation (2)
have martingale processes. The martingale property of vt allows us to focus entirely on the
dynamics caused by the future ﬁnal locking, as opposed to the eﬀects of predictable future
changes in the latent exchange rate.
The process 12 of the market expectations concerning the log euro locking rate xt
dxt =
{
σx,tdzx,t , if t < Tt
0 , otherwise
(4)
where dzx,t is a Wiener process.
Second, if the right hand side variables of equation (2) follow Brownian motion,13 then so
does vt. Hence, its process can be written as
dvt = σv,tdzv,t . (5)
Where dzv,t is a Wiener process, which is not necessarily independent from dzx,t. I assume
linear, contemporaneous relationship between the two shocks, what can be captured by their
time-varying correlation denoted by ρ (dzv,t, dzx,t).
The third factor, the market expectation concerning locking time Tt is modeled as a stochastic
variable. In the empirical part of the paper I ﬁlter the factors not only with stochastic Tt, but
also with constant Tt in order to see to what extent does the dynamics of Tt inﬂuence the
dynamics of the other factors. One can think of the constant locking time as having stochastic
locking time with volatility σT,t restricted to zero.
The assumed process of the market expectations concerning locking time is the following
martingale,
dTt =
{
(Tt − t)σT,tdzT,t , if t < Tt
0 , otherwise.
(6)
12In a discrete time framework the process can be derived from equation (3).
Δxt = [πt+1 − Et(πt+1)] +
Tt∑
i=t+2
[Et+1(πi)− Et(πi)]− [π∗t+1 −Et(π∗t+1)]−
Tt∑
i=t+2
[Et+1(π
∗
i )− Et(π∗i )] .
If both the expectation errors and the change of expectations are independent and normally distributed with zero
mean, then the process of xt is a Brownian motion in a continuous time framework.
13The assumption that the growth rate of GDP and the real appreciation rate are normally distributed comes
from two additional equations of the underlying macro model. One is the supply curve equation and the other
captures the Balassa-Samuelson eﬀect:
(5f) yt − yt−1 = β(πt −Et−1(πt)) β > 0 supply curve
(6f) dqt = −γdyt γ > 0 Balassa-Samuelson eﬀect (real appreciation).
The growth rate and the real appreciation rate should have normal distribution, because both are linear functions
of the normally distributed expectation error πt − Et−1(πt).
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Where dzT,t is a Wiener process which may correlate with the other two shocks dzv,t and dzx,t.
Given that the EMU candidate countries are not eligible to join the eurozone unless the
Maastricht criteria are fulﬁlled, the market expectations concerning the time of locking should
depend on the expected future inﬂation, debt-to-GDP and deﬁcit-to-GDP ratios. For the sake
of simplicity I assume that the Maastricht criteria can be simpliﬁed to one nominal and one
real criterion. Moreover, the nominal criterion is assumed to be captured by the expected
locking rate which is being driven by the future expected inﬂation rate according to equation
(3). The higher is the cumulated expected excess inﬂation rate, the later will the locking take
place. The real criteria are captured by the fundamental, which is a decreasing function of the
log output according to equation (2). The lower is the log output and therefore the higher is
the fundamental, the later will the country be eligible to join the euro area. This simpliﬁed
view on the Maastricht criteria can be described by the following Taylor-rule-type functional
relationship between the expected time until locking on one hand and the expected locking rate
and fundamental on the other hand.
Tt − t =
(
1
2λt
σ2t
cσ2x,t
x2t +
1
2λt
σ2t
cσ2v,t
v2t
)λt
λt > 0 . (7)
The instantaneous volatility of the expected locking date is the following function of the
expected time until locking:
σ2T,t = σ
2
t (Tt − t)−
1
λt . (8)
The parameters σ2t and λt are time-varying, therefore the number of factors is not reduced
by the restrictions of (7) and (8). 14
Besides equations (7) and (8), I pose another restriction on the processes. I assume that
there is no such shock that aﬀects both vt and xt but not Tt, because vt and xt are interrelated
through Tt as the correlation between nominal and real shocks helps to make the more binding
Maastricht criteria to earlier meet. Or in other words, shocks to xt and vt that are orthogonal
to shocks to Tt are assumed to be independent from each other as well. This assumption can be
formalized as
ρ(dzx,t, dzv,t) = ρ(dzT,t, dzv,t)ρ(dzT,t, dzx,t) . (9)
The exact functional form of (7) representing the convergence criteria and the restrictions
(8) and (9) can be motivated by the followings. As it is shown by the next Subsection 2.2,
the log exchange rate can be derived as a closed-form function st = f(t, vt, xt, Tt) of the factors
under these restrictions. Moreover, this functional relationship is also easily interpretable.
2.2 Functional Relationship Between The Exchange Rate And Underlying
Factors
Here, I derive the functional relationship between the exchange rate on the one hand and the
latent exchange rate, the market expectations concerning the locking time and locking rate
on the other hand. Subsection 2.2.1 presents the derivation under the assumption of having
constant locking time. Then I relax this assumption in Subsection 2.2.2 to derive the function
in the general case with stochastic locking time.
The derivation has the following two steps in both cases with constant and stochastic locking
time. First, I derive the process of the log exchange rate st from the processes of the factors by
14The three-eqution restriction of (7), (8) and (9) with λt and σ
2
t is used in Appendix A to derive the following
single-equation restriction without λt and σ
2
t : ρ (dzT,t, dzv,t)σv,t − ρ (dzT,t, dzx,t)σx,t = (vt − xt)σT,t(Tt−t)c .
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using Ito’s stochastic change-of-variable formula. Second, I obtain that the function satisfying
the derived process and the terminal condition sT ∗ = xT ∗ and equation (1) is given by
st = f(t, vt, xt, Tt) =
(
1− e−Tt−tc
)
vt + e−
Tt−t
c xt . (10)
2.2.1 Constant Locking Time
Here I assume that the locking time T is constant. According to Ito’s formula, the function
f(t, vt, xt, T ) should satisfy (11).
df =
[
∂f
∂t
+
∂f
∂vt
μv,t +
∂f
∂xt
μx,t +
1
2
∂2f
∂v2t
σ2v,t +
1
2
∂2f
∂x2t
σ2x,t +
1
2
∂2f
∂xt∂vt
ρ (dzv,t, dzx,t)σv,tσx,t
]
dt+
+
∂f
∂vt
σv,tdzv,t +
∂f
∂xt
σx,tdzx,t . (11)
The diﬀerent μ’s denote the drift terms, whose values are zero in equations (4) and (5).
At time T ∗ the exchange rate sT ∗ is equal to the market expectation concerning the ﬁnal
conversion rate xT ∗ , because at the time of locking the market already knows the conversion
rate. Consequently, the function f(t, vt, xt, T ) should satisfy the terminal condition
f(T ∗, vT ∗ , xT ∗ , T ∗) = xT ∗ . (12)
The solution is given by (10). The proof is provided in the general case with stochastic
locking time in Appendix A.
2.2.2 Stochastic Locking Time
Here I assume that the locking time Tt is stochastic and its process is given by (6). The
function f(t, vt, xt, Tt) is derived under the assumption of stochastic locking time similarly to
the deterministic case. The solution is again given by (10), however, this ﬁnding depends on how
the convergence criteria are modeled by (7) and also on restrictions (8) and (9). The convergence
criteria are modeled so to have exactly the same solution with stochastic locking time as with
constant one.
The Ito’s formula can be used again to ﬁnd the function f(t, vt, xt, Tt). By using Ito’s
stochastic change-of-variable formula, we will get a similar expression for df as previously with
constant locking time, however some new terms appear in the formula.
df =
[
∂f
∂t
+
∂f
∂vt
μv,t +
∂f
∂xt
μx,t +
∂f
∂Tt
μT,t +
1
2
∂2f
∂v2t
σ2v,t +
1
2
∂2f
∂x2t
σ2x,t+
+
1
2
∂2f
∂T 2t
σ2T,t(Tt − t)2 +
1
2
∂2f
∂Tt∂xt
ρ (dzT,t, dzx,t) (Tt − t)σT,tσx,t+
+
1
2
∂2f
∂Tt∂vt
ρ (dzT,t, dzv,t) (Tt − t)σT,tσv,t + 12
∂2f
∂xt∂vt
ρ (dzv,t, dzx,t) σv,tσx,t
]
dt+
+
∂f
∂vt
σv,tdzv,t +
∂f
∂xt
σx,tdzx,t +
∂f
∂Tt
(Tt − t)σT,tdzT,t. (13)
The diﬀerent μ’s denote the drift terms, whose values are zero in equations (4), (5) and (6).
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I obtain again that the function satisfying the derived process (13), the terminal condition
(12) and the equation (1) borrowed from Krugman (1991) 15 is given by (10). The proof can be
found in Appendix A.
Equation (10) shows that the log exchange rate is the weighted average of the log latent
exchange rate and the expected log ﬁnal conversion rate. The weights are changing over time;
if the time until locking is inﬁnite, or in other words, if the currency will never be locked, then
the weight of the latent exchange rate is one, and the weight of the expected conversion rate is
zero. As the time until locking decreases, the weight of the expected conversion rate increases.
Finally, as the time until locking approaches zero, the weight of the expected conversion rate
approaches one.
In order to examine the exchange rate dynamics of the model, I substitute (10),(4), (5) and
(6) into equation (13).
dst =
1
c
e−
Tt−t
c
1− e−Tt−tc
(xt − st) dt +
(
1− e−Tt−tc
)
σv,tdzv,t+ (14)
+e−
Tt−t
c σx,tdzx,t − 1
c
e−
Tt−t
c
1− e−Tt−tc
(xt − st) (Tt − t)σT,tdzT,t .
Equation (14) shows that the dynamics of the exchange rate is such that it converges to the
actual market expectation concerning the ﬁnal conversion rate. Moreover, the closer the time
of locking, the faster the convergence is.
Equations (4), (5), (6) and (10) deﬁne a three-factor model. One factor is the market expec-
tation concerning the ﬁnal conversion rate; another factor is the market expectation concerning
the time of locking; the third factor is the latent exchange rate.
3 Option Pricing
In this section I show a pricing formula for European-type options. The pricing formula is consis-
tent with the exchange rate model with constant locking time and factor volatilities. Although
not being fully consistent with the stochastic locking time, the pricing formula is used also in
the general framework with stochastic locking time to estimate parameters. The parameters to
be estimated are the variances of the innovations of the factors vt and xt. The historical option
prices are given in terms of implied volatility; consequently, I derive the pricing formula in terms
of volatility as well.
In the theoretical model the uncertainty is present due to the stochastic innovations (dzv,t,
dzx,t, dzT,t) of the factors; consequently, the price of an option is a function of the variances
and covariances of these normally distributed innovations. From equation (14) and (10), we can
derive, that the instantaneous variance of returns at time t is
σ2s,t =
(
1− e−Tt−tc
)2
σ2v,t +
(
e−
Tt−t
c
)2
σ2x,t +
(
1
c
e−
Tt−t
c
)2
(xt − vt)2 (Tt − t)2σ2T,t+
+ 2
(
1− e−Tt−tc
)(
e−
Tt−t
c
)
σv,tσx,tρ (dzv,t, dzx,t)+
− 21
c
e−
Tt−t
c (xt − vt) (Tt − t)σT,t
(
1− e−Tt−tc
)
σv,tρ (dzT,t, dzv,t)+
− 21
c
e−
Tt−t
c (xt − vt) (Tt − t)σT,te−
Tt−t
c σx,tρ (dzT,t, dzx,t) . (15)
15Similarly to the solution in the Krugman (1991) paper, equation (10) also satisﬁes a smooth pasting condition
dsT∗
dvT∗
= 0.
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In order to derive a closed form option pricing formula, I work with the simple constant
volatility model. I assume that the covariance matrix of the three shocks is constant over the
life of the option. Until now, I allowed σv,t, σx,t and σT,t and the correlations to change over
time. While I do not rule out the possibility, that the covariance matrix used to price option can
vary over time, I do not model the dynamics of the covariance matrix. Obviously, the price of
options in the stochastic volatility framework, is diﬀerent from the one of the constant volatility
framework, however the latter is a good approximation for the theoretical value of at-the-money
options with a maximum of one-year maturity.16
In order to have a closed form option pricing formula, I ﬁx not only the covariance matrix
over the life of the option, but also the market expectation concerning the locking date Tt.
By applying this ﬁnal simpliﬁcation and by calculating the integral we obtain the option
pricing formula
g(t,m, σx,t, σv,t, σT,t, ρ (dzv,t, dzx,t) , ρ (dzT,t, dzx,t) , ρ (dzT,t, dzv,t)) =
[∫ t+m
t
σ2s,τdτ
] 1
2
=
(
σ2v,tm + Γ1
[
σ2v,t + σ
2
x,t − 2ρ (dzv,t, dzx,t)σv,tσx,t+
− ρ2 (dzT,t, dzv,t) σ2v,t − ρ2 (dzT,t, dzx,t) σ2x,t + 2ρ (dzT,t, dzx,t)σx,tρ (dzT,t, dzv,t) σv,t
]
+
+ Γ2
[
−2σ2v,t + 2ρ (dzv,t, dzx,t) σv,tσx,t + 2ρ2 (dzT,t, dzv,t)σ2v,t+
− 2ρ (dzT,t, dzx,t)σx,tρ (dzT,t, dzv,t)σv,t
]) 1
2
. (16)
The option is sold at time t and the maturity of the option is denoted by m. The Γ1 =
c
2e
− 2
c
(Tt−t−m) − c2e−
2
c
(Tt−t) and the Γ2 = ce−
1
c
(Tt−t−m) − ce− 1c (Tt−t) .
4 Stylized Facts On The Stabilizing Eﬀect
This section investigates the stabilizing eﬀect of locking by looking at some stylized facts on the
term structure of options and by comparing estimated constant factor volatilities.
The stabilizing eﬀect of locking can be detected by comparing the volatility of the exchange
rate with future locking σs on the one hand and the volatility of exchange rate without locking
σv on the other hand. Obviously, if the former is smaller than the latter, then we can infer that
the prospect of locking stabilizes the exchange rate.
Under the assumption of having constant locking time and independent factors with constant
volatilities, the instantaneous variance of the exchange rate σ2s,t is the weighted average of the
variances of the factors x and v (see equation (15)). Consequently, it is suﬃcient to show σv > σx
in order to prove the existence of stabilizing eﬀect. It is important to notice, that the condition
σv > σx is suﬃcient only under the highly restrictive assumptions of having constant locking
time and independent factors with constant volatilities. If these restrictive assumptions are not
16As it is pointed out by Hull (1997, p. 620): ”For options that last less then a year, the pricing impact
of a stochastic volatility is fairly small in absolute terms. It becomes progressively larger as the life of option
increases.”
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fulﬁlled, then it is possible to have no exchange rate stabilization σs > σv despite of having more
volatile latent exchange rate than locking rate σv > σx. For instance, high uncertainty related
to the locking time can increase the volatility of the exchange rate with future locking even to
be more than the volatility of the latent exchange rate.
In the next sections, these restrictive assumptions will be relaxed and the magnitude of
the stabilizing eﬀect will be estimated by controlling for the uncertainty of the locking date,
the dynamics of the market expectation concerning the locking date, correlations between the
factors, and time-varying volatilities of the factors.
Unlike next sections, here it is assumed to have constant locking time and independent
factors with constant volatilities. The advantage of this framework, is that it is consistent with
the option pricing formula (17), therefore estimates on the factor volatilities are not subject to
bias due to model misspeciﬁcation. Moreover, even the term structure of implied volatilities can
provide us insight into the stabilizing feature of locking. In this framework the stabilizing eﬀect
is analyzed by applying two simple approaches. First, we look at the term structure of options.
Second, we compare estimated volatilities of the factors.
In this framework, the option pricing formula (16) reduces to
g(t,m, σx, σv) =
(
σ2v(m + Γ1 − 2Γ2) + σ2xΓ1
) 1
2
. (17)
The Γ1 = c2e
− 2
c
(T−t−m) − c2e−
2
c
(T−t) and the Γ2 = ce−
1
c
(T−t−m) − ce− 1c (T−t) .
The option pricing formula (17), but also our intuition suggest that longer options are more
exposed to shocks occurring in the far future than options with shorter maturities. Or in other
words, σx has higher relative weight in a longer option, then in a shorter one. And the opposite
holds for σv. Consequently, if the term structure of options is downward sloping, then σv > σx.
Therefore, a decreasing term structure can be interpreted as evidence for the stabilizing feature
of locking. This relationship between the term structure and the stabilizing eﬀect is not an if
and only if relationship, because even if the term structure is upward sloping, it is possible to
have σv > σx.
Table 4 shows the average implied volatilities for each of the six maturities for the three
countries. The six options are at-the-money (ATM) options and have diﬀerent maturities. In
case of Czech koruna and Polish zloty the maturities are one-month, two-months, three-months,
six-months, nine-months and one-year. Whereas in case of the Hungarian forint the currency
options have one-week, one-month, two-months, three-months, six-months and one-year m(6)
maturities. For more details on the data see Csa´va´s and Gereben (2005).
The average term structure of options is clearly downward sloping for Czech koruna and
Polish zloty, but not for Hungarian forint. In order to have a more detailed picture on the
Hungarian term structure, I divide the sample into two equal sized subsamples and calculate
the average implied volatilities for the two subsamples separately. In the second half of the
sample, the Hungarian term structure is downward sloping as well, but not in the ﬁrst one.
All in all, the average term structure of these countries suggest, that the prospect of locking
has stabilized the Czech koruna and Polish zloty, and also the Hungarian forint in the second
half of the sample. Purely based on the investigation of the term structure, we can not rule out,
that locking have stabilized the forint even in the ﬁrst half on the sample. In order to judge the
stabilization in that period and to make inferences on the magnitude of the stabilizing eﬀects, I
present estimates on the factor volatilities.
The option pricing formula (17) and historical option prices can be used to estimate the
constant volatilities σv, σx of the factors. I assume that the pricing errors, i.e. the diﬀerence
between the historical prices and the theoretical prices, are independent identically distributed
(IID) with Gaussian distribution. Under this assumption, the volatilities σv, σx can be estimated
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Table 1: The term structure of implied volatilities (Source: Reuters)
CZ HU PL
sample full full 1st half 2nd half full
σimp1W - 7.71% 6.37% 9.06% -
σimp1M 4.8% 7.69% 6.48% 8.9% 8.64%
σimp2M 4.76% 7.71% 6.72% 8.7% 8.5%
σimp3M 4.72% 7.78% 6.99% 8.57% 8.41%
σimp6M 4.71% 7.9% 7.35% 8.46% 8.3%
σimp9M 4.75% - - - 8.29%
σimp1Y 4.71% 8.04% 7.65% 8.43% 8.25%
Num. obs. 3168 3012 1506 1506 3162
by maximum likelihood method. The constant market expectation concerning the locking date
T is calibrated to 1.Feb.2008, 13.Feb.2010 and 8.Jun.2010. for Czech Republic, Hungary and
Poland respectively. The calibration is based on the ﬁltered Tˆt0 where t0 = 5.Jan.2005. is the
beginning of the sample (see Subsection 5.1 on the ﬁltering of Tt).
Table 4 presents the estimated factor volatilities. These point estimates support the existence
of the stabilizing eﬀect in all three countries as having σˆv > σˆx. Moreover, the diﬀerences between
the volatilities are signiﬁcant. Based on the likelihood ratio test, we can reject the null that the
volatilities are equal at 10% signiﬁcance level for each country and for both periods for Hungary.
And we can also reject the null even at 1% signiﬁcance level in three cases out of four.
This section have shown some empirical evidences on the stabilizing eﬀect under the highly
restrictive assumptions of having constant locking time and independent factors with constant
volatilities. In the followings, I will relax these assumptions and investigate whether our ﬁndings
on the stabilizing eﬀect remains still valid even under more general conditions.
5 Filtering Factors
I apply the Kalman ﬁlter technique to extract the time series of the factors from the time series
of the observable exchange rate. However, ﬁltering all three factors from only one series would
be overambitious and unlikely to provide robust results. Moreover, the Kalman ﬁlter technique
can be applied only if the model is linear17 in all the factors to be ﬁltered. In fact, the log
exchange rate st is linear in two of the factors, namely the latent exchange rate vt and the
market expectation concerning the ﬁnal conversion rate xt, but not in the expected date of
locking Tt. However, the expected date of locking Tt can be ﬁltered independently from the
other two factors.
Once Tt is given, the Kalman ﬁlter can be interpreted as a method for decomposing the
exchange rate changes ds into changes in the state variables v and x. Under the assumption of
having constant locking date T , the decomposition is such that the higher is the relative weight
17To ﬁlter all three factors from the time series of the exchange rate, one should apply a diﬀerent technique
then the Kalman ﬁlter, because the model is not linear in Tt. The Extended Kalman ﬁlter and the particle ﬁlter
are possible candidates.
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Table 2: The estimated constant volatilities of the latent exchange rate v and the
market expectation concerning the locking rate x – with independent factors and
constant locking time
CZ HU PL
sample full 1st half 2nd half full
σˆv 19.87% 12.55% 13.97% 20.06%
(t-stat) (201.16) (11.79) (9.06) (145.71)
σˆx 4.14% 8.26% 10.69% 7.87%
(t-stat) (183.16) (18.24) (33.54) (94.74)
LR-test σx = σv 4315.64 15.2 2.77 1365.36
critical value - 1% signif level 6.63 6.63 6.63 6.63
critical value - 10% signif level 2.71 2.71 2.71 2.71
Num. obs. 3168 1506 1506 3162
of v in s, and the higher is its volatility relative to that of the other factor σvσx , the higher change
will be attributed to v by the Kalman ﬁlter. (See Appendix D on the Kalman ﬁlter in general
and also on this special feature of it.)
The next Subsection 5.1 introduces the applied method and the results of ﬁltering Tt. Then,
I set up the ﬁltering problem for the remaining two factors in Subsection 5.2. Subsection 5.3
describes how the parameters of the ﬁltering problem are set. Finally, Subsection 5.4 presents
the ﬁltered market expectation concerning the locking rate xt and its estimated stabilizing eﬀect
on the exchange rate.
5.1 Filtering The Expected Locking Date
The expected date of locking can be estimated independently from the other two factors from the
euro and domestic yield curves. The yield curve method has been popularized by Bates (1999)
and it has been applied for Hungary by Csajbo´k and Rezessy (2006). The yield curve method is
based on the fact that after adopting the euro, the interest rate diﬀerential will become marginal,
but not before the adoption. The higher probability is attached by the market participant to
the scenario that a country is already a full-ﬂedged member of the eurozone by a given year, the
lower is the forward diﬀerential for that particular year. Along these lines the market expectation
on the date of locking can be estimated from the forward diﬀerentials. Appendix B describes
the method in details.
Figure 5.1 shows the smoothed and the original ﬁltered market expectations concerning the
locking dates. The smoothed time series is the moving average of the original time series where
the window size is 21. In the followings, I consider the smoothed time series to be the ﬁltered
Tˆt, because it is cleaned from daily noises.
The Reuters polls queries the analysts about their opinion on the most likely year of EMU
and ERM II entry of the three analyzed countries. These are the only references for the ﬁltered Tt
to be compared with. Consequently, I put also these survey data on Figure 5.1. The ﬁltered time
series and the survey-based one show similar trends. One can see that analysts expectations were
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relatively stable until the autumn of 2005 and have changed subsequently between the quarterly
polls of August and November for the Czech Republic and Poland, and between September and
October 2005 for Hungary. Until the autumn of 2005 the three countries had been expected to
enter ERM II in the year 2007. Thereafter, the expectations changed dramatically, as reﬂected
by the monthly and quarterly Reuters polls, pointing to a postponement of ERM II entry to
2008 for the Czech Republic, to 2009 for Poland, and to 2010 for Hungary. Similar trend can be
detected in the expected EMU entry date. The ﬁltered locking dates suggest that expectations
were subject to both positive and negative shocks during 2006 and the ﬁrst quarter of 2007 in all
three countries. The positive shocks shifting the expected locking date of Hungary and Poland
substantially upwards have started in July 2005 according to the ﬁltered locking date, whereas
the survey-based expectations have changed only a few months later. This ﬁnding suggests that
the estimates on the expected locking date provide us earlier warnings on the changes in the
market sentiment than the surveys. In the ﬁrst half of 2006 the ﬁltered expected locking dates
have downward trends in Hungary and Poland, which is either due to some favorable news on
the EMU outlook, or due to a correction of the previous overshooting of the expectations.
The locking of the exchange rate can precede the EMU entry, but not vice versa. For instance,
the exchange rates of almost all the countries that entered the ERM II system in recent years18
are almost ﬁxed: the volatility of the Estonian kroon, the Lithuanian lita, the Slovenian tolar,
the Cyprus pound and the Maltese lira dropped below 1% after entering the ERM II regime.
These facts imply that practically locking does not necessarily take place when a country enters
the monetary union, but rather when it enters the ERM II regime. The ﬁltered locking date of
the Czech Republic has ﬂuctuated between the narrow band given by the survey-based expected
EMU and ERM II entry dates, which is in accordance with the sequence of locking and EMU
entry. Whereas in case of Hungary and Poland the survey-based expected EMU entry dates
precede sometimes the yield curve based locking dates. Or in other words, the survey-based
expectations are more optimistic relative to the yield curve based estimates. Since I have more
conﬁdence in the ﬁltered expectations then in the survey-based expectations, I attribute the
diﬀerence to systematic bias in the survey data. This systematic bias can be explained, for
instance, with the skewed distribution of the entry date. If market analysts report the most
likely entry date of a country, i.e. the mode of the distribution, instead of the expected value
and if the subjective distribution of the entry date is skewed towards a later entry date, then
the survey-based expectations are downward biased estimates on the expected locking dates.
Once we have estimates on Tt, we can ﬁlter the other two factors from the historical exchange
rate by Kalman ﬁlter. In the Kalman ﬁlter I treat Tt as being exogenously given.
5.2 Filtering Problem
Here, I set up the ﬁltering problem for xt and vt under the general case of modeling Tt as a
stochastic variable. I do not derive the ﬁltering problem for the case with constant locking time
separately, because it is just a special case of the general one with the zero restriction for the
correlation parameters and σT,t.
In contrast to the case with constant locking date, the shocks to the factors do correlate
under the assumption of having stochastic locking date. Since the third factor Tt is exogenous
and it is not independent from the other two factors, I have to use the conditional distributions
of xt and vt, where I condition on the realization of Tt. The conditional expected innovations of
xt and vt are σx,tρ(dzT,t, dzx,t)dzT,t and σv,tρ(dzT,t, dzv,t)dzT,t respectively. The expected values
of the innovations are taken into account in the model by having a constant as a third state
18The Estonian kroon, the Lithuanian lita and the Slovenian tolar joined ERM II on 27 June 2004. On 2 May
2005 three other Member States joined ERM II: Cyprus, Latvia and Malta.
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variable. Moreover, the system covariance matrix Q(t) is also conditional on Tt.
The ﬁltering problem can be written in the usual form:
Λ(t + 1) = A(t)Λ(t) + w1(t + 1) (18)
Ω(t) = C(t)Λ(t) + w2(t) (19)
E
[(
w1(t + 1)
w2(t)
)
(w1(t + 1) w2(t))
]
=
(
Q(t) 0
0 R
)
(20)
In our problem, the vector of states is Λ
′
(t) =
(
vt xt 1
)
. The system matrix is
A(t) =
⎛
⎜⎝
1 0 σv,tρ(dzT,t, dzv,t) dTtσT,t(Tt−t)
0 1 σx,tρ(dzT,t, dzx,t) dTtσT,t(Tt−t)
0 0 1
⎞
⎟⎠ .
The vector w1(t) is assumed to be a Gaussian vector white noise. The observable variable
is the log exchange rate Ω(t) = st. Equation (10) implies that the observation matrix is C(t) =(
1− e−Tt−tc e−Tt−tc 0
)
.
The system covariance matrix can be written as
Q(t) =
⎛
⎝ Q1,1(t) Q1,2(t) 0Q1,2(t) Q2,2(t) 0
0 0 0
⎞
⎠ .
where the covariance is conditional on the observed Tt, therefore
Q1,1(t) = σ2v,t
[
1− ρ2(dzT,t, dzv,t)
]
,
Q1,2(t) = σv,tσx,t [ρ(dzx,t, dzv,t)− ρ(dzT,t, dzv,t)ρ(dzT,t, dzx,t)] ,
Q2,2(t) = σ2x,t
[
1− ρ2(dzT,t, dzx,t)
]
.
The conditional covariance Q1,2 between dzx,t and dzv,t is zero due to the restriction (9). In
contrast to the conditional covariance, the unconditional covariance between dzx,t and dzv,t is
not zero, which is captured by the system matrix A(t).
I assume that the error term w2(t) is zero. In other words, the exchange rate is assumed to
be observed without error and the model (10) perfectly describes the relationship between the
factors and the exchange rate. Hence, the variance of the observation error term R is set to
zero. The Kalman ﬁlter remains valid even in this case.19
In our problem, the observation matrix C(t), the system matrix A(t) and the system covari-
ance Q(t) are changing over time.20
The parameters c, σv,t, σx,t, σT,t, ρ(dzv,t, dzx,t), ρ(dzT,t, dzx,t) and ρ(dzT,t, dzv,t) of the sys-
tem covariance Q(t) and of the system matrix A(t) need to be either calibrated or estimated.
Moreover, the initial values xt0 and vt0 of the factors belonging to the beginning of the sample
period, t0 = 5.Jan.2005., need to be set as well. The next Subsection describes how these
parameters are estimated or calibrated.
19See Harvey (1990) page 108 for a detailed discussion.
20I used the Kalman ﬁlter toolbox for Matlab written by Kevin Murphy. Its advantage is that it allows for
time-varying parameters. (See http://www.ai.mit.edu/ murphyk/Software/kalman.html for details.)
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5.3 Parameters
This Subsection shows how the parameters c, σT,t, xt0 , vt0 , ρ(dzv,t, dzx,t), ρ(dzT,t, dzx,t),
ρ(dzT,t, dzv,t), σv,t and σx,t are calibrated or estimated in the general case with stochastic locking
time. The calibration of parameters is almost the same with the constant locking time as with the
stochastic locking time. The calibration in the constant case deviates from that with stochastic
locking time only by having the constant market expectation concerning the locking date T set
equal to the initial value of the ﬁltered time series Tt0 and the parameters σT,t, ρ(dzv,t, dzx,t),
ρ(dzT,t, dzx,t) and ρ(dzT,t, dzv,t) are zero.
By following Engel and West (2005), I calibrate the parameter c based on estimates on
the interest rate semi-elasticity of money demand. Frankel (1979), Stock and Watson (1993,
802, table 2, panel 1) and Bilson (1978) estimate the semi-elasticity approximately 29, 40, 60
respectively. These estimates are either on quarterly data or rescaled to quarterly basis. By
dividing the quarterly semi-elasticity parameter by 4 we get the annualized c parameter. It
should be in the range of 7.25–15. I calibrate c to the average (cˆ = 10.75) of the estimates of
the three cited studies and I use the two extreme values of the range for sensitivity analyses.
One can interpret the parameter value of c around 10.75 as follows. If a country will lock
its exchange rate to the euro in four years, then the elasticity of the exchange rate with respect
to market expectations concerning the ﬁnal conversion rate (e−
T−t
c = e−
4
10.75 ) is almost 70%. If
locking is expected to occur in two years, then this elasticity or the relative weight of the log
ﬁnal conversion rate in the log exchange rate is more than 80%.
Figure 5.3 shows the relative weight of the locking rate component of the log exchange rate
in the investigated period. Under the assumption of constant locking date, it is a monotonous
exponential increasing function of time. More interesting is the case with stochastic locking
date, where positive shocks to Tt can even decrease the relative weight of x. In that case, the
relative weights are stable for the Czech Republic, just like the expected time until locking.
For Hungary and Poland, the largest change in the relative weights took place after July 2005,
when the market sentiment on the EMU entry chances has started to become more and more
pessimistic. Thereafter, the upward shift in the relative weight of x in the ﬁrst half of 2006 is
due to the decreasing trend of the market expectation concerning the time until locking.
The market expectation concerning the locking date Tt is estimated from the yield curves as it
is discussed in Subsection 5.1. Under the assumption of stochastic locking date, its volatility σT,t
is estimated from the ﬁltered Tˆt. Since estimates on σT,t may be sensitive to the window size of
the moving average used to smooth the original ﬁltered locking time, I calculated the stabilizing
eﬀect of future locking with diﬀerent window sizes as part of the sensitivity analysis. In case
of over-smoothing the original time series, the estimated volatility becomes downward biased,
whereas failure to average out some errors leads to upward bias. Each value of the time-varying
volatility is estimated from 11 data points
σˆT,t =
√√√√ t+5days∑
τ=t−5days
(
dTˆτ
Tˆτ − τ
)2
. (21)
For a given value of c, one can calibrate the initial values of the factors xt0 and vt0 . What
makes these calibrations somewhat diﬃcult is that I have no direct information on the latent
exchange rate. For the calibration of the initial states, xt0 and vt0 I use the Reuters polls. I
assume that xt0 is equal to the log of averaged expectations on the central parity reported by
the last Reuters polls of 2004. The initial value of vt0 is calculated by plugging st0 , cˆ and Tˆt0
into equations (10).
The calibrated initial values are utilized in the Kalman ﬁlter not only as the initial state
variables, but also to estimate the correlations. These estimated correlations are plugged into
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the system matrix and the system covariance matrix used to ﬁlter the next period state variables.
And these ﬁltered state variables are used again for estimating the correlations between the next
period’s shocks. These steps of estimation and ﬁltering follow each other until the end of the
Universe or until the end of the sample.
By rearranging (4) and (6) we obtain that the correlation between the shocks to market
expectation concerning the locking rate and locking date is equal to ρ(dzT,t, dzx,t) = dxtdTt
σT,t(Tt−t)
σx,t
.
This formula suggests that it is suﬃcient to calibrate or estimate Tt, σT,t, dxtdTt and σx,t in order
to obtain the correlation.
Among these terms dxtdTt is calibrated based on the inﬂation dynamics. Equation (3) of the
exchange rate model assumes that the market expectation concerning the log locking rate xt
equals to the diﬀerence between the current domestic and eurozone log prices plus the cumulated
expected excess domestic inﬂation rate over the eurozone inﬂation rate. Based on a plausible
view on the inﬂation dynamics until locking, we can calibrate dxtdTt . This term is likely to depend
more on the reaction of the domestic inﬂation path to a change in the expected locking date due
to real shocks, rather then on the reaction of the expected locking date to inﬂationary shocks.
The calibration of dxtdTt depends on which of these eﬀects is considered to be more relevant. Both
eﬀects and the corresponding calibrations are discussed below.
My view on the ﬁrst eﬀect is that the targeted path of the inﬂation of the domestic central
bank depends on the outlook for the locking date. Following a shift in the expected locking
date, the targeted path of inﬂation is assumed to be adjusted so that the inﬂationary Maastricht
criterion will be met only at the new expected locking date. Further, I assume, that the targeted
inﬂation at the locking date is 2 % no matter when the locking will be realized and whether the
country had higher or even lower inﬂation rate before. Moreover, the eurozone inﬂation rate is
expected to be constant 2 % as well until the locking date.
My assumption on the second eﬀect is that if the locking is postponed due to an inﬂationary
shock, then the rate of disinﬂation will remain unchanged.
This strategy of the central bank is illustrated by Figure 5.3 under the scenario of having
higher initial inﬂation rate then the targeted inﬂation rate. The initial inﬂation rate π of
Figure 5.3 is expected to decrease linearly to the targeted inﬂation rate π∗ until time T . Hence,
the initial cumulated excess inﬂation rate is the checkboard area. The economy can be hit either
by inﬂationary or by real shocks.
If the expected locking date shifts to T s due to a real shock, then the cumulated inﬂation
rate will increase by the dotted area. Under this scenario the term dxtdTt is half of the excess
inﬂation π−π
∗
2 .
If the expected locking date shifts to T s due to an inﬂationary shock increasing the inﬂation
rate to πs, then the cumulated inﬂation rate will increase not only by the dotted area, but also
by the striped one. Under this scenario, the term dxtdTt is the product of the time until locking
and the constant rate of disinﬂation ν.
I consider the real shocks to be more relevant, because EMU entry delays were mainly due
to ﬁscal slippages in Hungary. Moreover, in Czech Republic and Poland the inﬂation rates were
already moderate in the analyzed period. Table 5.3 presents the inﬂation rates by country and
by year and also the average inﬂation rate used for calibration. I calibrate dxtdTt equal to half of
the average excess inﬂation rate over 2%: -0.085 %, 1.15% and -0.125 % for Czech Republic,
Hungary and Poland respectively.
As part of the sensitivity analysis I use the alternative approach of calibration, where dxtdTt
is the function of the disinﬂation rate ν and the time until locking T − t. Table 5.3 reports
the disinﬂation rate calculated as the ratio of the average excess inﬂation rate over 2% and the
average ﬁltered time until locking. With this approach, the average calibrated values of dxtdTt are
twice as big as with the other calibration approach.
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Table 3: Harmonized consumer price index HCPI (Source: IFS)
2005 2006 2007 Q1 Average21
YoY YoY QoQ (2005-2007Q1)
CZ 1.60% 2.09% 1.71% 1.83%
HU 3.48% 4.04% 8.81% 4.32%
PL 2.18% 1.27% 1.96% 1.75%
Table 4: The average time until locking and the disinﬂation rate
Average Disinﬂation
time until locking rate22ν
CZ 3.21 years -0.05%
HU 5.57 years 0.41%
PL 6.06 years -0.04%
Once I have calibrated or estimated c, Tt, σT,t, dxtdTt and the factors x and v have already been
ﬁltered until time t, the only terms that need to be estimated are the volatilities σx,t and σv,t.
To see this, I show that the correlations can be expressed as functions of some already calibrated
or estimated parameters and the volatilities σx,t and σv,t. The calibrated or estimated variables
are denoted by hats.
ρ(dzT,t, dzx,t) =
ˆdxt
dTt
σˆT,t(Tˆt − t)
σx,t
. (22)
By using (7), (8) and (9) and (22), we obtain
ρ(dzT,t, dzv,t) =
(vˆt − xˆt)σˆT,t(Tˆt − t)
σv,tcˆ
+
ˆdxt
dTt
σˆT,t(Tˆt − t)
σv,t
. (23)
Finally, by substituting (22) and (23) into equation (9), we obtain
ρ(dzv,t, dzx,t) =
ˆdxt
dTt
σˆT,t(Tˆt − t)
σx,t
[
(vˆt − xˆt)σˆT,t(Tˆt − t)
σv,tcˆ
+
ˆdxt
dTt
σˆT,t(Tˆt − t)
σv,t
]
. (24)
The time-varying volatilities σx,t and σv,t are estimated from six implied volatilities σ
imp
t,i
for each time t by ordinary least squares (OLS). The six options have diﬀerent maturities m(i).
The basic idea of the estimation is to minimize the distance between the theoretical and the
historical option prices.
21The average inﬂation rate is calculated as the weighted average of the yearly and quarterly inﬂation rates,
where the weight of the quarterly inﬂation rate is one-forth of that of the yearly rates.
22The disinﬂation rate is calculated as the ratio of the excess average inﬂation rate over 2% and the average
expected time until locking. For instance, for Czech Republic ν = 1.83%−2%
3.21
= −0.05%. The average time until
locking is the mean of the ﬁltered time until locking.
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The OLS estimates of σv,t and σx,t satisfy the minimization problem
min
σv,t,σx,t
6∑
i=1
[
g(t,m(i), σx,t, σv,t, σT,t, ρ (dzv,t, dzx,t) , ρ (dzT,t, dzx,t) , ρ (dzT,t, dzv,t))− σimpt,i
]2
.
(25)
The option pricing formula for g() is given by (16). All the input parameters of the pricing
formula should be substituted by their estimated or calibrated values. The only exceptions
are the correlations, which are substituted by the expressions of (22),(23) and (24), where the
correlations are functions of the volatilities σv,t and σx,t.
Figure 5.3 shows the historical option prices with the shortest and longest maturities and also
the ﬁtted values. One can see from Figure 5.3 that the implied volatilities of the options with
the shortest maturity ﬂuctuate around the implied volatilities of the options with the longest
maturity. In those periods, when the short implied volatility exceeds the long one, the ﬁtted
short volatility exceeds the ﬁtted long one as well. This is reﬂected by the increased estimated
volatility of vt and the decreased estimated volatility of xt in these periods (see Figure 5.3). The
higher than average σv,t and the substantially lower than average σx,t in these periods can be
explained by the followings: ﬁrst, the relative option prices suggests that uncertainty concerning
shocks in the short horizon increases relatively to that in the long horizon; second, σv,t can be
thought of as a proxy for the short-run uncertainty, whereas σx,t reﬂects more the expected
magnitude of shocks occurring in the far future.
Figure 5.3 shows that on average σ¯v,t > σ¯x,t for all three countries, providing further support
for the stabilizing eﬀect of locking. In the followings, I will calculate not only the factor volatili-
ties estimated from option prices, but also the volatilities of the ﬁltered factors. Moreover, I will
measure the stabilizing eﬀect as the relative diﬀerence between the realized volatility and the
volatility of the ﬁltered latent exchange rate. The advantage of this measure of the stabilizing
eﬀect is that it better reﬂects the magnitude of the ex post stabilization as being calculated from
the exchange rate.
Figure 5.3 shows not only the estimated volatilities of vt and xt, but also that of the third
factors Tt. The estimated volatility of Tt is higher than average in those periods when there
are big changes in the ﬁltered locking date. Among the three countries, Czech Republic has the
highest average volatility of Tt, despite of the fact that the ﬁltered locking date Tˆt is the most
stable for Czech Republic (see Figure 5.1). The magnitude of the volatility can be explained by
the followings. First, Czech Republic is likely to be the ﬁrst among these countries that will be
eligible to join the EMU. Second, the volatility measures the variation of the relative change of
the expectations and not the absolute. The relative change of the expectation is a decreasing
function of the market expectation concerning the time until locking.
5.4 The Filtered Expected Locking Rate And The Stabilizing Eﬀect Of Lock-
ing
Figure 5.4 shows the historical exchange rates of the koruna, the forint and the zloty against
the euro, the ﬁltered states and analysts’ average expectations concerning the central parity as
polled by Reuters. Market expectations about the ﬁnal conversion rate may be thought to be
close to the expected central parity of the ERM II regime. In that case, the expected central
parity is a good reference for the ﬁltered expected ﬁnal conversion rate to be compared with.
Here, we compare the ﬁltered market expectations with the average expectations reported by
the Reuters polls.
Respondents’ views on central ERM II parities vary a lot in each poll (see: Figure 5.4). There
is at least 6% diﬀerence between the two extreme views of the analysts, and even diﬀerences
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of more than 20% being nothing rare. These diﬀerences indicate that uncertainty around the
reported expectations is likely to be big, which one needs to bear in mind when taking the
average reported expectations as the general view of the market on central parity.
As is evident from Figure 5.4, the patterns of the ﬁltered expected ﬁnal conversion rate and
of the reported expected central parity are similar for each of the three countries. The diﬀerence
between the ﬁltered and the survey-based expectation is always less than 5% for Czech Republic.
For Hungary and Poland this diﬀerence is more than 5% in a few times, but never exceeds 10%.
Although being higher than for Czech Republic, still the diﬀerence can be considered to be
moderate for Hungary and Poland as well.
According to a naive approach, the spot exchange rate can be considered as noisy estimates
on the locking rate. By taking this approach as a bench-mark, the criterion for ﬁltering the
expected locking rate successfully, is that the ﬁltered locking rate moves closer together with
some alternative measures of the locking rate than the historical exchange rate. Table 5.4 shows
that the innovations in the ﬁltered log locking rate for Hungary correlate somewhat more with
the changes in the survey-based log locking rate than the exchange rate returns. This ﬁnding can
be interpreted, as the model helped to de-noise the naive estimates on the locking rate. For the
other two countries, the ﬁltering can not be taken to be successful on the same basis, however,
there the substantially fewer number of observations disables us to make any ﬁrm conclusion.
It is worth to compare the ﬁltered locking rate xˆt not only with the survey-based expectation,
but also with the ﬁltered latent exchange rate vˆt. In this model higher vˆt than xˆt suggest that
inﬂation is less of a problem for the economy. Whereas in the opposite case, a later EMU entry
is partly due to the high current and future expected inﬂation.
The ﬁltered locking rate is weaker than the ﬁltered latent exchange rate in Hungary, support-
ing the view that not only the criteria on the real variables, but also the inﬂationary Maastricht
criterion is binding. In contrast to Hungary, the ﬁltered locking rate is stronger than the ﬁltered
latent exchange rate in Poland, what is due to the low inﬂation rate in the analyzed period. For
Czech Republic, there is no signiﬁcant diﬀerence between the ﬁltered locking rate and the latent
exchange rate.
We have some important ﬁndings on the volatility of the expected ﬁnal conversion rate as
well. The volatility of market expectations concerning the ﬁnal conversion rate is important,
because relatively stable market expectations can stabilize the exchange rate. The locking rate
is often referred to as the nominal anchor of the exchange rate that can decrease the volatility
of the exchange rate through the expectation channel.
Table 5: The volatility of ﬁltered and survey-based locking rate (X) and the corre-
lations of their percentage changes with the exchange rate returns (ds) –
All data are on the frequency of the survey data
CZ HU PL
σ(Xsurvey) 2.4% 3.93% 4.31%
σ(Xfiltered) 4% 5.7% 7.48%
ρ(ds, dxsurvey) 72.43% 23.18% 42.35%
ρ(dxfiltered, dxsurvey) 33.33% 24.22% 11.96%
Frequency Quarterly Montly Quarterly
Num. obs. of Xsurvey, Xfiltered, S 7 19 7
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Regarding the volatilities, one can see from Table 5.4 that the ﬁltered x is more volatile than
the survey-based expectation both calculated from data on the same frequencies. This ﬁnding
might adversely modify our previous view based purely on the Reuters polls on the stabilizing
feature of locking. Still, if the volatility of x is lower than that of s, then market expectations
concerning the ﬁnal conversion rate might have some stabilizing eﬀect on the exchange rate.
The advantage of ﬁltering the market expectations over using the survey-based expectations is
that no reliable estimate can be given on the volatility of x, and on its relative weight in the
exchange rate from the low frequency Reuters polls data, therefore no estimate can be given for
the stabilizing eﬀect of the locking either purely from survey data.
The big picture on the stabilizing feature of locking in the entire sample period is provided
by Table 5.4. The stabilizing eﬀect of locking is calculated as the relative diﬀerence between
the volatilities of the historical exchange rate and the ﬁltered latent exchange rate. Across the
sample period, the stabilizing eﬀect of locking is found to be the highest in Czech Republic.
And somewhat lower, but still high in Poland and Hungary. Even in these two countries, the
stabilizing eﬀect is substantial, the volatility without future locking would be approximately
twice as large.
Table 6: The volatility of the exchange rate (S) and the latent exchange rate (V ) –
with stochastic Tt and time-varying volatilities
CZ HU PL
σS 5.47% 9.49% 10.34%
σVˆ 12.88% 17.71% 21.26%
σS−σVˆ
σ
Vˆ
-57.52% -46.41% -51.37%
Window size for smoothing the original ﬁltered Tˆt is 21, c = 10.75,
dxt
dTt
equals to half of the average excess inﬂation rate over 2%: -0.085 %,
1.15%, and -0.125 % for Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland respectively
The estimated stabilizing eﬀect is robust to the calibration of the parameter c. The ex-
pectations concerning the locking decrease the volatility at least by 30% even under a smaller
parameter of 7.25 for each of the countries (see Table 6 in Appendix C). The stabilizing eﬀect
is increasing in c, for c = 15 it is close 60% (see Table 6 in Appendix C).
Appendix C presents the results of some other sensitivity analysis as well. The estimates
are robust not only to the calibration of c, but also to the calibration of dxtdTt (see Table 6) .
Moreover, it is robust to the window size used to smooth the original ﬁltered Tt (see Tables 6
and 6 ).
The sensitivity of the stabilizing eﬀect to the locking date is also investigated. Instead
of assuming stochastic locking time, one may assume to have either constant or deterministic
locking time. In the constant case the market expectation concerning the locking date is set
equal to the initial value of the ﬁltered locking time (Tt = Tt0 where t0 = 5.Jan.2005.). Whereas
in the deterministic case, we have time-varying locking time with zero volatility, i.e. the market
expectation concerning the locking date is set equal to the ﬁltered one and it is assumed to
be independent from the other factors. In order to see, to what extent does the stabilizing
eﬀect depend on the dynamics of the volatilities σv,t and σx,t, I calculate the stabilizing eﬀect
also with constant volatilities. These constant volatilities are set equal to the averages of their
time-varying estimates. Tables 6, 6 and 6 show that the magnitude of the stabilizing eﬀect is
robust even to the locking date and the dynamics of the volatilities.
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This model is rich in dynamics: we have time-varying volatilities σv,t σx,t σT,t, and stochastic
Tt. Each of these dynamics may have important eﬀect on the ﬁltered time series of the factors.
In order to see what drives the dynamics of the ﬁltered states I shut down each of these eﬀects
one by one. First, I ﬁlter the states with deterministic Tt , i.e. with zero σT,t, but with
time-varying Tt. Second, I ﬁlter the states with constant Tt, by shutting down not only the
dynamics due to σT,t, but also the one due to time-varying Tt. Finally, I look at the eﬀect of
time-varying volatilities on the dynamics of the ﬁltered xt by ﬁltering with zero σT,t and with
constant volatilities σv,t and σx,t. These constant volatilities are set equal to the averages of
their time-varying estimates. Figure 5.4 clearly shows that most of the dynamics of the ﬁltered
x is due to the dynamics of the exchange rate as other sources of dynamics do not seem to
change the patterns of the ﬁltered factors substantially.
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6 Conclusion
This paper investigated market expectations concerning the locking rate of EMU candidate
countries based on a theoretical model for exchange rate subject to future locking. The model is
the conventional asset-pricing exchange rate model extended with the future locking assumption.
In this model, the exchange rate converges to the actual market expectation concerning the
locking rate in expected term. The asset-pricing model with ﬁnal locking is a three-factor model,
where the factors are the market expectations concerning the locking rate, the locking date and
the latent exchange rate. In the empirical part of the paper, I used the model to ﬁlter out the
subjective expectation of market participants concerning the locking rate for Czech Republic,
Hungary and Poland.
One of the important contributions of the paper to the theoretical exchange rate literature is
the following: it ﬁnds empirical support for the conventional asset-pricing exchange rate model.
If we consider the survey-based expectation to be unbiased estimates on the expectation of the
markets, then the exchange rate model used to ﬁlter the market expectation should be taken
to be successful provided the ﬁltered expectations are close to the reported expectations of the
surveys. This test of the model is akin to the one applied by Engel and West (2005). Engel
and West provide also some empirical support for this type of models based on the forecasting
ability of the future fundamentals.23
Another important ﬁnding of the paper is that the stabilizing eﬀect of the future locking
is substantial. This ﬁnding is robust to the calibration of the parameters. Moreover, this
qualitative result is in line with our view based on the term structure of option prices and also
with our view purely based on Reuters polls data. In contrast to the low frequency Reuters polls
data, our high frequency data on the ﬁltered state variables enables us to measure the magnitude
of the stabilizing eﬀect. The estimated eﬀect is that the volatility without future locking would
be approximately twice as large as its current level in all three countries. The magnitude of the
stabilizing eﬀect depends on two determinants - the stability of market expectations concerning
the locking rate, and the importance of expectations in determining the exchange rate. In case of
an earlier euro area entry, the stabilizing eﬀect is likely to be more substantial, because market
expectations concerning the locking rate are themselves more stable. Moreover, the relative
weight of the expectations in the exchange rate is also higher. Based on this intuitive argument,
the prospect of locking should contribute the most to the stabilization of the koruna, compared
to the other two currencies. Actually, the estimated stabilizing eﬀect of locking is found to be
the highest in Czech Republic.
As a next step, my future research will aim at examining the exchange rates of the main
currency pairs by using the same idea presented in this paper. The exchange rate of the main
currency pairs can also be expressed as a weighted average of a short and a long term component
in accordance with the asset-pricing view. The long term component of the exchange rate can
be justiﬁed not only by the possibility of ﬁnal locking, but also by the long run reversion of
the exchange rate to its PPP level. To complete the analogy between the locking and the no
locking case, the uncertainty related to the half-lives of exchange rate deviations from PPP plays
23For many years, the standard criterion for judging the exchange rate models has been based on the forecasting
power relative to the random-walk model. This criterion was ﬁrst proposed by the seminal paper of Meese and
Rogoﬀ (1983). Recently, Engel and West (2005) has questioned the standard criterion. They have demonstrated
on a similar model to the one in this paper that if fundamentals are integrated of order one and the discount
factor is close to unity then the exchange rate will approximately follow random-walk. The important implication
of this result is that the standard criterion is not useful at judging the performance of exchange rate models.
Engel and West (2005) have proposed an alternative criterion, which is based on the forecasting ability of the
future fundamental.
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a similar role in case of the main exchange rates as the uncertainty related to the locking time
of the analyzed currencies.
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Appendix A
Here, I prove, that the derived function st = f(t, vt, xt, Tt) of (10) satisﬁes the implicit
relationship between the exchange rate and fundamental (1).
By calculating the partial derivatives of (10) and by substituting these derivatives and μv,t =
μx,t = μT,t = 0 into (13), we obtain
dst =
[
1
c
e−
Tt−t
c (xt − vt) + 12
1
c2
e−
Tt−t
c (xt − vt)σ2T,t(Tt − t)2+
− 1
2
1
c
e−
Tt−t
c ρ (dzT,t, dzx,t) (Tt − t)σT,tσx,t + 12
1
c
e−
Tt−t
c ρ (dzT,t, dzv,t) (Tt − t)σT,tσv,t
]
dt+
+
(
1− e−Tt−tc
)
σv,tdzv,t + e−
Tt−t
c σx,tdzx,t − 1
c
e−
Tt−t
c (xt − vt)(Tt − t)σT,tdzT,t. (26)
By using (26), the expected instantaneous change of the exchange rate can be expressed as
Et(dst)
dt
=
[
1
c
e−
Tt−t
c (xt − vt) + 12
1
c2
e−
Tt−t
c (xt − vt)σ2T,t(Tt − t)2 +
− 1
2
1
c
e−
Tt−t
c ρ (dzT,t, dzx,t) (Tt − t)σT,tσx,t + 12
1
c
e−
Tt−t
c ρ (dzT,t, dzv,t) (Tt − t)σT,tσv,t
]
.
(27)
The implicit function (1) can be rewritten as
Et(dst)
dt
=
1
c
(st − vt) . (28)
Consequently, if the RHS of equation (27) is equal to the RHS of equation (28), then the
implicit function (1) is satisﬁed by (10). In order to prove the equality, it is suﬃcient to show
that the ﬁrst term of the RHS of (27) is equal to the RHS of (28), whereas the other three terms
of (27) sum up to zero.
By rearranging (10), we obtain that the ﬁrst term of the RHS of (27) is equal to the RHS of
(28).
1
c
(st − vt) = 1
c
e−
Tt−t
c (xt − vt) . (29)
What remains to prove is that the other three terms of (27) sum up to zero. After some
simpliﬁcation, we get that this zero condition is equivalent with
(xt − vt)σT,t(Tt − t)
c
− ρ (dzT,t, dzx,t)σx,t + ρ (dzT,t, dzv,t)σv,t = 0 . (30)
In order to prove (30), I derive ρ (dzT,t, dzx,t) σx,t and ρ (dzT,t, dzv,t)σv,t from equations (7),
(8) and (9). Equation (9) restricts the partial eﬀect of xt on vt to be zero ( ∂vt∂xt = 0).
ρ (dzT,t, dzx,t)σx,t =
dTt
dx
σ2x,t
σT,t
=
(
∂Tt
∂xt
+
∂Tt
∂vt
∂vt
∂xt
)
σ2x,t
σT,t
=
(
∂Tt
∂xt
)
σ2x,t
σT,t
=
= λt(Tt − t)1−
1
λt
1
2λt
σ2t
cσ2x,t
2xt
σ2x,t
σT,t
=
σT,t(Tt − t)
c
xt . (31)
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ρ (dzT,t, dzv,t)σv,t =
dTt
dv
σ2v,t
σT,t
=
(
∂Tt
∂vt
+
∂Tt
∂xt
∂xt
∂vt
)
σ2v,t
σT,t
=
(
∂Tt
∂vt
)
σ2v,t
σT,t
=
= λt(Tt − t)1−
1
λt
1
2λt
σ2t
cσ2v,t
2vt
σ2v,t
σT,t
=
σT,t(Tt − t)
c
vt . (32)
The derived formulas of (32) and (31) prove (30). Consequently, the three terms of (27) sum
up to zero. Therefore, the RHS of equation (27) is equal to the RHS of equation (28). This
equality proves that the implicit function (1) is satisﬁed by (10).
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Appendix B
This appendix shortly introduces the yield curve method applied to estimate the market
expectation concerning the locking date. The paper by Bates (1999) and Csajbo´k and Rezessy
(2006) provide a more detailed description on this method.
The market expectation, formed at time t, on the date of locking Tt can be estimated from the
forward diﬀerentials as follows. The expected value is calculated from the subjective probability
distribution of the year the country enters the EMU.
Tt =
T¯∑
i=t
pt(EMUi) i (33)
where pt(EMUi) is the probability that the market attaches at time t to the scenario in which
the country becomes a full member of eurozone in the ith year. The distribution is assumed
to have ﬁnite support, the country will join the eurozone in the year T¯ at the latest. The
marginal probability pt(EMUi) can be calculated from the cumulative probability distribution
Pt(EMUi). The interpretation of Pt(EMUi) is straightforward, this is the probability that the
market attaches at time t to the scenario in which the country is in the EMU by the ith year.
The cumulative probability can be derived from the pricing equation of the one-year forward
interest diﬀerential.
FSt,i = (1− P (EMUi))FSnon−EMUit,i + P (EMUi)FSEMUit,i (34)
where FSt,i is the one-year forward interest rate diﬀerential for year i observed at time t. The
FSnon−EMUit,i and FS
EMUi
t,i are the expected interest rate diﬀerentials under the two alternative
scenarios, i.e. the accession country is either in or out the eurozone by year i. By rearranging
(34) we obtain
P (EMUi) =
FSnon−EMUit,i − FSt,i
FSnon−EMUit,i − FSEMUit,i
(35)
Among the right-hand-side variables of (35) only FSt,i is observable. However, by assuming that
the analyzed countries will surly enter the EMU in nine years, and have almost zero chance to
become an EMU member in one year, we can set FSnon−EMUit,i = FSt,t+1 and FS
EMUi
t,i = FSt,t+9.
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Appendix C
This appendix presents the results of some sensitivity analysis. The parameters which are
not subject of the analysis are calibrated exactly the same as in the baseline case presented in
Table 5.4.
Table 7: The volatility of the exchange rate (S) and the latent exchange rate (V ) –
Parameter c is calibrated to 7.25
CZ HU PL
σS 5.47% 9.49% 10.34%
σVˆ 10.09% 13.72% 16.88%
σS−σVˆ
σ
Vˆ
-45.78% -30.83% -38.78%
Table 8: The volatility of the exchange rate (S) and the latent exchange rate (V ) –
Parameter c is calibrated to 15
CZ HU PL
σS 5.47% 9.49% 10.34%
σVˆ 16.31% 22.61% 26.79%
σS−σVˆ
σ
Vˆ
-66.45% -58.03% -61.41%
Table 9: The volatility of the exchange rate (S) and the latent exchange rate (V ) –
Parameter dxtdTt is calibrated under the assumption that changes in the expected
locking date are due to inﬂationary shocks
CZ HU PL
σS 5.47% 9.49% 10.34%
σVˆ 12.81% 17.65% 21.28%
σS−σVˆ
σ
Vˆ
-57.29% -46.24% -51.43%
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Table 10: The volatility of the exchange rate (S) and the latent exchange rate (V )
The window size used to smooth the original ﬁltered Tt is 41
CZ HU PL
σS 5.47% 9.47% 10.41%
σVˆ 13.09% 17.65% 20.5%
σS−σVˆ
σ
Vˆ
-58.18% -46.31% -49.24%
Table 11: The volatility of the exchange rate (S) and the latent exchange rate (V )
The window size used to smooth the original ﬁltered Tt is 11
CZ HU PL
σS 5.45% 9.5% 10.31%
σVˆ 13.19% 18.13% 21.5%
σS−σVˆ
σ
Vˆ
-58.66% -47.61% -52.06%
Table 12: The volatility of the exchange rate (S) and of the latent exchange rate
(V ) – with deterministic locking time
CZ HU PL
σS 5.47% 9.49% 10.34%
σVˆ 13.03% 17.7% 21.04%
σS−σVˆ
σ
Vˆ
-58.01% -46.4% -50.87%
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Table 13: The volatility of the exchange rate (S) and of the latent exchange rate
(V ) – with constant locking time (Tt = Tt0 where t0 = 5.Jan.2005.)
CZ HU PL
σS 5.47% 9.49% 10.34%
σVˆ 12.46% 23.72% 21.87%
σS−σVˆ
σ
Vˆ
-56.09% -59.99% -52.73%
Table 14: The volatility of the exchange rate (S) and of the latent exchange rate
(V ) – with deterministic locking time and constant volatilities σx,t = ¯ˆσx,t, σv,t = ¯ˆσv,t
CZ HU PL
σS 5.47% 9.49% 10.34%
σVˆ 11.68% 13.34% 18.6%
σS−σVˆ
σ
Vˆ
-53.14% -28.84% -44.42%
.
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Appendix D
This appendix shortly introduces the Kalman ﬁlter. It derives the estimator of the state
vector Λ(t) for the general model and also for the restricted model with constant Tt. The
estimator of the restricted model clearly shows that Kalman ﬁlter can be interpreted as follows.
It decomposes the exchange rate changes ds into changes in the state variables v and x. The
higher is the relative weight of v in s, and the higher is its volatility relative to that of the other
factor σvσx , the higher change is attributed to v by the Kalman ﬁlter.
The Kalman ﬁlter is a recursive procedure for computing the optimal estimator of the state
vector Λ(t), based on information available at time t. The state vector of time t is estimated
from the previous periods’ estimated state Λˆ(t− 1) and the estimated covariance matrix of the
estimation error ˆCov(v(t − 1)).
The predicted value of state Λ(t) is A(t−1)Λˆ(t−1) based on equation (18) and the prediction
error is v(t|t − 1) = Λ(t) − A(t − 1)Λˆ(t − 1) = A(t − 1)(Λ(t − 1) − Λˆ(t − 1)) + w1(t − 1). The
predicted state is diﬀerent from the estimated state, because the former is calculated purely
from the estimated state of the previous periods and does not utilize the time t realization of the
observable variable Ω(t). Therefore, the prediction error is diﬀerent from the estimation error,
that is v(t−1) = Λ(t−1)−Λˆ(t−1) for the previous period. The prediction error can be expressed
as a function of the previous periods’ estimation error v(t|t − 1) = A(t− 1)v(t − 1) + w1(t− 1)
and its covariance matrix can be written as
Cov(v(t|t − 1)) = A(t − 1)Cov(v(t − 1))A′(t − 1) + Q(t− 1) . (36)
Now, the estimator of the state vector of time t is conditional not only on the estimates of
the previous state vector, but also on the contemporaneous observable variable Ω(t). In our
system Λ(t) and Ω(t) are jointly normally distributed, consequently, the expected value of the
vector of states Λ(t) conditional on the observation Ω(t) is
E(Λ(t)|Ω(t)) = E(Λ(t)) + Cov(Λ(t),Ω(t))V ar−1(Ω(t))(Ω(t) −E(Ω(t))) . (37)
Equation (37) is the key for the estimator of the state vector. The estimator of the state
vector of time t can be obtained by substituting the estimators of the terms on the right-hand-
side into equation (37). First, let us see what are the estimators for these terms, than we can
put together the estimator for Λ(t). Equation (18) shows that the unconditional expected value
E(Λ(t)) = A(t− 1)Λ(t − 1) . (38)
The covariance is Cov(Λ(t),Ω(t)) = E[(Λ(t)−E(Λ(t)))(Ω(t)−E(Ω(t)))′ ], therefore, one can
estimate it by
ˆCov(Λ(t),Ω(t)) = E[(Λ(t) −A(t − 1)Λˆ(t− 1))(C(t)Λ(t) +w2(t)− C(t)Λˆ(t))′ ] =
= E[(Λ(t) −A(t − 1)Λˆ(t− 1))(Λ(t) −A(t − 1)Λˆ(t− 1))′C ′(t)] = ˆCov(v(t|t − 1))C ′(t) . (39)
The observable Ω(t) = C(t)Λ(t) +w2(t), therefore its variance is
V ar(Ω(t)) = C(t)Cov(v(t|t − 1))C ′(t) + R(t) . (40)
By substituting equations (38), (39), and (40) into equation (37) we get that the estimator
for the state vector at time t is
Λˆ(t) = A(t− 1)Λˆ(t− 1)+
+ ˆCov(v(t|t − 1))C ′(t)(C(t) ˆCov(v(t|t − 1))C ′(t) + R(t))−1(Ω(t)− C(t)A(t − 1)Λˆ(t− 1)) .
(41)
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Where ˆCov(v(t|t − 1)) = A(t− 1) ˆCov(v(t − 1))A′(t− 1) + Q(t− 1).
What we are left with is to provide estimates for Cov(v(t)) that will be used in the next step
of the recursive process of the Kalman ﬁlter. The estimator is given by
Cov(v(t)) = Cov(v(t|t − 1)) − Cov(v(t|t − 1))C ′(t)(C(t)Cov(v(t|t − 1))C ′(t) +
+ R(t))−1C(t)Cov(v(t|t − 1)).
After deriving the Kalman estimator for the state vector in the general case, I will show that
the estimator reduces to a simple, easily interpretable formula in a special case. This special
case is the one, where we have constant or deterministic Tt, the noise w2 is restricted to zero.
For the sake of simplicity, I assume also that Cov(v(t − 1)) = 0, or in other words, the state of
the previous period is known. Under these assumptions the variance of the observation error R
is zero, the system matrix A is the identity matrix; and Cov(v(t|t − 1)) = Q(t − 1) is diagonal.
In this special case the general formula (41) simpliﬁes to
Λˆ(t) = Λˆ(t− 1) + Q(t− 1)C ′(t)(C(t)Q(t − 1)C ′(t))−1(Ω(t)− Ω(t− 1)) . (42)
By substituting Λ
′
(t) =
(
vt xt
)
, Ω(t) = st, C(t) =
(
1− e−Tt−tc e−Tt−tc
)
, and Q(t −
1) =
(
σ2v,t−1 0
0 σ2x,t−1
)
into (42) we get the following estimator for the two state variables of
time t:
vˆt = vˆt−1 +
1− e−Tt−tc
(1− e−Tt−tc )2σ2v,t−1 + (e−
Tt−t
c )2σ2x,t−1
σ2v,t−1dst (43)
xˆt = xˆt−1 +
e−
Tt−t
c
(1− e−Tt−tc )2σ2v,t−1 + (e−
Tt−t
c )2σ2x,t−1
σ2x,t−1dst (44)
These estimators provide an intuitive interpretation of the Kalman ﬁlter in this exchange
rate model. It decomposes the exchange rate changes ds into changes in v and x. The higher is
the relative weight of v in s, i.e the higher is 1− e−Tt−tc , and the higher is its volatility relative
to that of the other factor σvσx , the higher is the estimated innovation in v. Similarly, the higher
is the relative weight of x in s, and the higher is its volatility relative to that of the other factor
σx
σv
, the higher is the estimated innovation in x.
MNB WORKING PAPERS • 2008/1 37
MAGYAR NEMZETI BANK FIGURES
Figure 1: The average expectation of the analysts concerning the EMU and the
ERM II entry date and the ﬁltered locking date Tt
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Figure 2: The relative weight of the expected log locking rate xt in the log exchange
rate st – with constant and stochastic locking date
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Figure 3: Stylized inﬂation paths until locking
?
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Figure 4: The option prices with the shortest and longest maturities and the ﬁtted
values in terms of volatility – with stochastic locking date
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Figure 5: The estimated volatilities of xt, vt and Tt – with stochastic locking date
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Figure 6: The ﬁltered expected locking rate, the latent exchange rate, the historical
exchange rate and the survey-based expected locking rate – with stochastic locking
date
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Figure 7: The ﬁltered expected locking rate with stochastic, deterministic and
constant Tt and with time-varying and constant σx,t and σv,t
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Figure 8: Minimum, maximum and average expectation of the market analysts
concerning the central parity in the ERM II
Czech Republic
04−Jan−2005 19−Jul−2005 31−Jan−2006 16−Aug−2006 06−Mar−2007
26
28
30
32
34
36
average expected central parity in ERM II (Reuters polls)
min. expected central parity in ERM II (Reuters polls)
max. expected central parity in ERM II (Reuters polls)
Hungary
04−Jan−2005 13−Jul−2005 01−Feb−2006 25−Aug−2006 06−Mar−2007
240
250
260
270
280
290
300
average expected central parity in ERM II (Reuters polls)
min. expected central parity in ERM II (Reuters polls)
max. expected central parity in ERM II (Reuters polls)
Poland
04−Jan−2005 19−Jul−2005 30−Jan−2006 15−Aug−2006 05−Mar−2007
3
3.5
4
4.5
5
average expected central parity in ERM II (Reuters polls)
min. expected central parity in ERM II (Reuters polls)
max. expected central parity in ERM II (Reuters polls)
45



